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INTRODUCTION 
I want to begin by thanking Marquette University Law School and 
the organizers of the Boden Lecture for inviting me here today.  It’s an 
honor to be invited to deliver a lecture named after such an illustrious 
dean.  And it’s an honor to be invited by Dean Joseph Kearney, who is 
not just a distinguished dean in his own right but someone known in the 
legal world for his integrity and decency.  Even back in the days when 
we clerked together, he held the respect of every clerk at the Supreme 
Court.  It has been especially lovely to watch him during the last twenty-
four hours.  There’s an old saw in election circles that one campaigns in 
poetry and governs in prose, and it’s been a delight to watch Dean 
Kearney move seamlessly from one to the other.  When he speaks about 
the students, the faculty, or the mission of Marquette Law School, it’s all 
poetry.  And yet Dean Kearney is also the person who instructed me 
that this talk should be forty-three minutes long. 
Today I will use my forty-three minutes to offer food for thought.  
Not a fully-worked-out theory, not a firm claim, but a series of 
observations about the current state of campaign-finance law and its 
long-term effects on American politics. 
Here’s what I’m not going to say: I’m not going to tell you the near-
ubiquitous tale that reformers, reporters, and even a fair number of 
academics tell about the current state of campaign finance.  That story is 
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United1 treated 
corporations as if they were individuals for the first time.  It thereby 
ushered in a new era of corporate spending, with wealthy corporations 
spending wildly, saturating the airwaves, and taking over American 
politics.  The story is that Citizens United has caused a sea change in 
American politics, and the Court’s overturning of Austin2—the much-
revered case in which the Court upheld campaign-finance regulations in 
 
1. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
2. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
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order to promote equality—was the modern-day equivalent of Plessy v. 
Ferguson.3 
Even setting aside the overwrought reference to Plessy, almost all of 
that story is wrong, and some of it is utter nonsense.  And I say that not 
as someone who is against campaign-finance regulation, but as someone 
who believes in it.  I say that as someone who believes that there is a 
bigger story about the relationship between Citizens United and 
American politics; it’s just not the story the media and reformers are 
telling.   
Here I will argue that the so-called “dark money” trend may be a 
symptom of a deeper shift taking place in our political process.  And it is 
one that Citizens United has helped bring about.  Citizens United 
mattered, but not for the reasons that most people seem to think.  Here, 
in short, I hope to tell you the real problem with Citizens United. 
Part I offers a brief history of campaign-finance reform and debunks 
the conventional wisdom about the case.  It ends by suggesting that 
Citizens United mattered for reasons that have little to do with 
corporations or equality.  Instead, the most important part of the 
opinion concerned the relationship between independent spending and 
corruption. 
Part II shows how the Court’s corruption ruling has changed the 
political landscape.  We all know that there is more “dark money” in the 
system—money spent by sources that are virtually untraceable—and we 
all know how troubling it is to have large amounts of dark money 
flowing through the election system.  But the conventional wisdom may 
be missing something more fundamental about the effects of Citizens 
United: The decision may ultimately push our current party system 
toward one that is dominated by powerful groups acting outside the 
formal party structure.  The worry, then, isn’t so much about dark 
money, but “shadow parties”—organizations outside of the party that 
house the party elites. 
Part III explains why the emergence of shadow parties could further 
weaken our already-flagging political system.  It suggests that shadow 
parties risk undermining the influence of politics’ saving grace: the 
“party faithful,” who play a crucial role in connecting everyday citizens 
to party elites. 
 
3. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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I. THE REAL PROBLEM WITH CITIZENS UNITED 
To understand why Citizens United really matters, you have to know 
some history.4  The tale we tell in the academy is that in the beginning 
(or the early 1970s at any rate) Congress created the Federal Election 
Campaign Act,5 and we saw that it was good.  The snake in this garden 
of campaign-finance Eden was the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley 
v. Valeo.6  There, the Supreme Court famously drew a distinction for 
First Amendment purposes between contributions (the money given to 
a campaign) and expenditures (the money spent on a campaign).  On 
the Court’s view, expenditures were closely tied to cherished First 
Amendment activities and thus hard to regulate, let alone cap.  
Contributions, on the other hand, raised weaker First Amendment 
concerns and thus could be subject to more regulation, including caps.   
You can see the problem.  Congress intended to regulate both sides 
of the money/politics equation—the money donated and the money 
spent.  By lifting the cap on expenditures while leaving in place the cap 
on contributions, the Supreme Court created a world in which 
politicians’ appetite for money would be limitless but their ability to get 
it would not.  Two of my academic colleagues analogized it to giving 
money-starved politicians access to an all-you-can-eat financial buffet 
but insisting they can only serve themselves with a teaspoon.7 
We all know what happened.  Just what you would expect to happen.  
Political interests inevitably looked for loopholes, they inevitably found 
loopholes, and they inevitably drove big trucks of money through those 
loopholes.  There was the soft money loophole.  When that got closed, 
people started to use issue ads to bypass the existing rules.  Then came 
527s and “swift boating.”  The 527s have been displaced by SuperPACs 
and 501(c)(4)s and (c)(6)s.  As a result, the entire reform game has been 
focused on closing those loopholes, engaging in the regulatory 
equivalent of whack-a-mole. 
 
4. The next few paragraphs are drawn from a speech I delivered at Georgia State Law 
School.  See Heather Gerken, Keynote Address: Lobbying as the New Campaign Finance, 27 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1155 (2011). 
5. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 et seq. 
(2012)). 
6. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
7. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance 
Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1711 (1999). 
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A. Why the Court’s Rulings on Corporations and Austin Were Doctrinal 
Sideshows 
This brings me to the first mistake in the tale we tell about Citizens 
United, and it will be a familiar point to anyone who has been involved 
in this game of regulatory whack-a-mole.  The floodgates of corporate 
spending were open well before Citizens United.8  Due to an earlier 
Supreme Court decision that originated from Marquette’s home state of 
Wisconsin,9 certain kinds of corporate and union ads were 
constitutionally protected so long as they were phrased carefully.  
Provided that those ads didn’t explicitly encourage people to vote for or 
against a candidate, they were protected.  Citizens United simply 
eliminated the need to be careful about phrasing the ad copy.  To offer a 
crude example, before Citizens United, a corporation could run an ad 
saying, “Senator X kicks puppies—Call Senator X and tell him to stop 
kicking puppies.”  After Citizens United, a corporation could run an ad 
saying, “Senator X kicks puppies—Don’t vote for the puppy-kicking 
Senator X.”  If there was a time to amend the Constitution to prohibit 
corporate speech, it was well before Citizens United, which means it was 
well before anyone thought there was a problem. 
Nor can we blame Citizens United for the fact that independent 
spending—corporate or other—is hard to trace.  Citizens United ruled 
eight to one in favor of the constitutionality of transparency measures, 
upholding a variety of disclosure and disclaimer rules.10  The fact that so 
much independent election spending is “dark money” must be laid at 
the feet of Congress and the Federal Election Commission (FEC), 
which have failed to enact adequate disclosure regulations. 
The final mistake in the reformers’ tale of woe is the suggestion that 
it was a disaster when Citizens United overruled Austin,11 the solitary 
Supreme Court case that relied on the equality rationale to uphold a 
campaign-finance regulation.12  You can imagine why reformers were so 
attached to Austin.  Equality is a deeply intuitive justification for 
campaign-finance regulation.  But the overruling of Austin was even less 
significant than what the Court said about corporate speech.  Austin was 
 
8. This point was made early on by Nate Persily.  See Nathaniel Persily, The Floodgates 
Were Already Open, SLATE (Jan. 25, 2010, 2:30 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_
politics/jurisprudence/2010/01/the_floodgates_were_already_open.html. 
9. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
10. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365–71 (2010). 
11. Id. at 365. 
12. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
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a symbol, to be sure.  In terms of the doctrine, however, the case was a 
sport.  Austin would have been an important case if it had ever been 
followed.  But it hadn’t.  By overruling Austin, all the Court did was 
formally confirm the case’s irrelevance to current doctrine. 
B. Why the Court’s Ruling on Corruption Mattered 
Citizens United was important, however.  It was important for 
reasons that reformers, in particular, don’t want to talk about.  That’s 
because Citizens United substantially cut back on the power that 
Congress has to regulate in this area.  It is that part of the ruling—not 
the part about corporations, not the part about equality—that is 
reshaping the campaign-finance landscape.13 
As any first-year law student can tell you, when Congress regulates 
in this area, it must have a good reason to do so.  And Citizens United 
seems to have dramatically cut back on the reasons Congress can 
regulate.  That’s because it substantially narrowed the definition of 
corruption, which is regularly invoked whenever Congress wants to pass 
reform.  Indeed, while reformers have mourned the Court’s rejection of 
the equality rationale, the most important line in Citizens United was not 
the one overruling Austin.  It was this one: “Ingratiation and 
access . . . are not corruption.”14 
For many years before Citizens United, the Court had gradually 
expanded the corruption rationale to extend beyond “quid pro quo 
corruption” (I give you money, you give me votes).  The Court had 
licensed Congress to regulate even when the threat was simply that large 
donors had better access to politicians or that politicians had become 
“too compliant with the[ir] wishes.”15  Indeed, at times the Court went so 
far as to say that even the mere appearance of “undue influence” or the 
public’s “cynical assumption that large donors call the tune”16 was 
enough to justify regulation. 
Before Citizens United, in other words, “ingratiation and access” 
were corruption.  This loose definition of corruption was easy to satisfy 
and easy to invoke when regulating campaign finance.  After all, if 
 
13. The next three paragraphs are drawn from a speech I delivered at Georgia State.  
See Gerken, supra note 4. 
14. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360. 
15. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000). 
16. FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001); Nixon, 
528 U.S. at 390. 
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Congress can regulate whenever the American people think the fix is in, 
it can regulate at any time.17  What this meant in practice is that 
reformers could get almost everything they would have gotten from 
Austin without ever having to say the word equality. 
But Justice Anthony Kennedy isn’t a fool.  He was well aware of 
what his more-liberal colleagues had been doing with the corruption 
rationale, and he did everything he could in Citizens United to put a stop 
to it.  Kennedy didn’t say that the Court was overruling these cases.  But 
that’s just what it was doing. 
Citizens United thus shifted the regulatory terrain surrounding 
independent spending—the spending that is not done in conjunction 
with the party or the candidate.  That’s the money spent by SuperPACs.  
That’s the money spent by Karl Rove’s Crossroads GPS.  That’s the 
money that Justice Kennedy told us does not corrupt, which means 
that’s the money that neither Congress nor the FEC can regulate heavily 
going forward.  Citizens United, in sum, didn’t matter because of what it 
said about corporations.  It mattered because of what it said about 
corruption.  If you are going to amend the Constitution, focus on the 
corruption ruling, not on whether, to quote Mitt Romney, “corporations 
are people,” too.18 
The evidence that the corruption rationale is the one that matters is 
clear.  Lower court decision after lower court decision has struck down 
regulations on independent spending.19  That’s why we have SuperPACs.  
That’s why the 501(c)(4)s and (c)(6)s are hard to regulate. 
 The numbers tell the same story.  There was a lot more money 
swishing around in 2012 than in prior years.  And much of that money 
involved independent expenditures, often untraceable ones.  But that 
money—as best we can tell—hasn’t signaled a giant uptick in corporate 
spending.  The share of corporate spending looks roughly the same.  
 
17. Cf. Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign 
Finance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 119 (2004) 
(showing that public perceptions of corruption have remained strong over time and are 
unaffected by changes in campaign-finance regulation). 
18. Philip Rucker, Mitt Romney Says ‘Corporations are People’ at Iowa State Fair, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/mitt-romney-says-
corporations-are-people/2011/08/11/gIQABwZ38I_story.html. 
19. See, e.g., Iowa Right To Life Comm. v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576 (8th Cir. 2013); Texans 
for Free Enter. v. Texas Ethics Comm’n, 732 F.3d 535 (5th Cir. 2013); SpeechNow.org v. 
FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long 
Beach, 603 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2010); Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 
2010).  
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And it’s not hard to guess why.  Most corporations would rather stay out 
of the game.  It’s dangerous, for one thing, as Target learned when it 
was subjected to a boycott for supporting a conservative gubernatorial 
candidate who opposed same-sex marriage.20  Companies also worry 
about getting shaken down by politicians on both sides of the aisle.  As a 
general matter, corporations do much better by investing their resources 
in lobbying, where their influence is both outsized and hidden from 
view.  That’s where the smart corporate money goes.  
 To conclude the point: Citizens United mattered.  But it mattered for 
reasons that people have largely ignored.  It didn’t unleash the 
corporate floodgates.  It didn’t fundamentally shift the doctrine when it 
overruled Austin.  It didn’t even prevent Congress or the FEC from 
shedding light on the sources of “dark money.”  What Citizens United 
did do is substantially limit the extent to which Congress or the states 
can limit independent expenditures.  That mattered for 2012.  And it 
may matter even more, going forward, for the reasons I suggest in Part 
II. 
II. DARK MONEY AND SHADOW PARTIES 
The corruption ruling leads me to what I believe to be the real 
problem with Citizens United.  Or, more accurately, it leads me to the 
two real problems with Citizens United.  The first is dark money, and the 
second is shadow parties. 
Dark money is the problem that you know.  Thanks in part to the 
Court’s corruption ruling, there was a lot of dark money in 2012.  In 
2008 the Obama campaign had a record 800 million dollars.  One 
political scientist told me at the time that Obama had more money than 
God, although I’m not sure how we’d verify that.  But the independent 
groups that were spending in 2012 had a great deal more money.  
Estimates consistently put that number well over a billion dollars.  
That’s billion with a “b.”  And much of that was dark money that cannot 
be traced to its origins. 
As I noted above, we can’t really lay the blame for dark money at 
the Court’s feet.21  The push toward independent spending was already 
 
20. Andrea Chang, Target, Gay Rights Supporters at Odds Over How to Settle Dispute, 
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/08/business/la-fi-target-gay-
20110409; Andrew Stern, Target Corp Targeted for Political Donation, REUTERS (Aug. 3, 
2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/03/usa-elections-contributions-idUSN031684732 
0100803. 
21. See supra Part I.A. 
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happening in large part due to the failure of Congress and the FEC to 
keep up with the game of regulatory whack-a-mole.  Even before 
Citizens United, 501(c) organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce 
or Crossroads GPS—the independent organizations that absolutely 
dominated the 2012 elections—fell outside current regulations.  Nor has 
Congress or the FEC done what is needed to trace where the 
independent money is flowing.  Citizens United didn’t cause that 
problem.  But by deregulating independent spending in a world without 
adequate disclosure measures, it exacerbated the situation and 
prevented Congress and the FEC from adopting sensible fixes going 
forward.  Needless to say, dark money is a problem.  We worry when 
billionaires can secretly spend gigantic amounts of cash to support 
candidates. 
I won’t rehash those worries here.  I’ll just say that as much as I 
worry about dark money, I worry more that dark money is just a 
symptom of a deeper trend in campaign finance.  My worry is less about 
money and politics and more about power and politics.  My worry isn’t 
about dark money.  It’s about shadow parties.  My worry is that the 
SuperPACs and 501(c) organizations might someday become shadow 
parties, as political elites adapt to the new regulatory environment 
ushered in by Citizens United. 
A. The Challenge of Party Regulation: Political Elites as Shape-Shifters 
So what is the relationship between money and power in this cycle?  
It’s a perfect example of what Sam Issacharoff and Pam Karlan call the 
“hydraulics” of campaign finance.22  Campaign-finance regulations do 
not reduce money’s influence; they simply force it into different outlets.  
Party donors whose contributions were limited turned to soft money.  
When the soft money loophole was closed, the money went into 527s.  
527s morphed into SuperPACs, then 501(c)(4)s and (c)(6)s.  The money 
is still in the system; it’s just traveling down different channels.  Hence 
the depressing lesson about the hydraulics of campaign-finance reform: 
Regulation doesn’t necessarily reduce the amount of money in the 
system.  It may just shift money into different channels. 
That is what many people in my field predicted would be happening 
in 2012.  But they missed a crucial feature about 2012 spending.  They 
assumed that money in 2012 would move away from the parties into 
other structures and that the parties would therefore lose control of it.  
 
22. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 7. 
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Some even thought this would give incumbent politicians an incentive to 
regulate independent spending.  Incumbents, after all, naturally worry 
about independent organizations stepping on a campaign’s message, 
sending the wrong signal, and depriving candidates and parties of the 
control they prefer to exercise over spending.  Indeed, the one point of 
agreement between incumbents on both sides of the aisle is that they’d 
prefer to keep the money in their hands.   
It turns out, however, that parties still exercise a great deal of control 
over independent spending.  What do I mean by that?  If the money is 
being spent by outside groups, how can “the parties” control it?  To 
understand how the parties can still control independent spending—to 
understand why Citizens United might shift the terrain of politics—you 
have to understand not the hydraulics of campaign finance, but the 
hydraulics of party power.  You have to understand that parties are not 
stable legal entities but shape-shifters.  Once you understand how party 
elites can retain control over “independent” organizations, you might 
start to worry that Citizens United matters for quite different reasons 
than we’ve suspected. 
B. Parties as Shape-Shifters 
Here I draw heavily on an article by Michael Kang, although it was 
written almost a decade ago and devoted to different questions.23  Kang 
argued that Issacharoff and Karlan had it wrong when they talked about 
the hydraulics of campaign finance.  He claimed that they mistook what 
is really a symptom of the hydraulics of party power for an independent 
phenomenon.24  It’s not money that has a hydraulic force, Kang tells us.  
It’s power.  Political energy.  Campaign-finance regulation is but the 
most visible example of the ways in which legal regulation can redirect, 
but not eliminate, political energies. 
To understand the argument, it’s useful to start with the basic point.  
Political parties are not a thing, like a table or a chair.25  They aren’t 
stable legal entities.26  They are a loose collection of interests, gathered 
 
23. Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics of Party Regulation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 
131 (2005). 
24. Id. at 149. 
25. To use Dan Lowenstein’s colorful phrase, parties aren’t like “a chair, or a planet, or 
a baked potato.”  Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political Parties: A 
Skeptical Inquiry, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1759 (1993). 
26. Kang, supra note 23, at 143–46; see also Lowenstein, supra note 25.   
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together to compete with other interests to put policies into place.  They 
can thus take different forms as circumstances dictate. 
This means that political parties are very hard to regulate.27  They 
are shape-shifters.  Each time we try to regulate a particular type of 
political institution, political entrepreneurs find new outlets to channel 
their energies, new institutions to occupy, new means of exercising 
power. 
1. The Presidential Nomination Process 
The best known example in political science is the McGovern-Fraser 
reforms, and here I should apologize to my political science readers for 
retelling what has become a bedtime story for their graduate students.28  
In the wake of the 1968 nominating convention, the Democratic Party 
substantially reformed the nominating process.  We now think of 
conventions as something akin to a coronation—a chance to sell a 
candidate to the public, not a moment when decisions get made.  But for 
those too young to remember, conventions used to be the moment when 
the standard-bearer was chosen.  There really were smoke-filled rooms, 
and the nominating process was almost entirely in the control of party 
bosses. 
The reforms had one major purpose: to take power away from the 
party bosses and give it to the party membership.  It was the party elites 
vs. the party faithful, the party leadership vs. its ground troops, the 
people who controlled the money vs. the people who cast the ballots.  
Thus was born the nominating process we know today, one relying on 
primaries and caucuses and involving broad participation by party 
members. 
For a long time, political scientists thought that McGovern-Fraser 
meant the end of party elites.  But it turns out that the Empire always 
strikes back.  Party elites have still managed to exercise a substantial 
amount of control over the nominating process despite the absolutely 
fundamental structural changes that McGovern-Fraser introduced.  In 
fact, over the last decades, almost every single presidential candidate 
nominated by either party has been the candidate favored by the 
political elites.  The Democrats are more fractious, admittedly, but the 
 
27. Kang, supra note 23, at 155–60. 
28. For an overview, see, e.g., LARRY M. BARTELS, PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES AND 
THE DYNAMICS OF PUBLIC CHOICE (1988); NELSON W. POLSBY, CONSEQUENCES OF PARTY 
REFORM (1983).  
GERKEN-FINAL (6-30-14) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2014  5:33 PM 
914 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:4 
Republicans have been virtually in lockstep with their party leaders.  
2008 was an outlier in this respect.  It was the only recent election where 
both candidates were not the candidates chosen by the elite.  John 
McCain looked like a traditional GOP candidate, but he was loathed by 
party insiders because he was perceived as disloyal.  And Hillary 
Clinton was the choice of party elites, at least at the beginning of the 
process.   
How is it that political elites no longer have the formal power to 
choose, and yet they still choose?  How do they manage it?  Elites 
exercise influence through what political scientists call the “invisible 
primary.”29  If you watch a presidential race closely, you’ll notice that 
before a single vote is cast, there is a seemingly endless array of 
endorsements (the infamous superdelegate controversy of 2008 just 
scratches the surface).  What elites do, in essence, is signal to each other 
which candidate they prefer.  Money, support, and boots on the ground 
come with those endorsements.  And with money, support, and boots on 
the ground come votes.  Hence the rather astonishing success of party 
elites.  It’s not a foolproof system, but it has a far better record of 
success than most things in politics. 
2. Shape-Shifting and Party Regulation in Wisconsin 
The invisible primary is just one example of the hydraulics of party 
power—the way that shutting down one outlet for political power leads 
others to be forced open.  Marquette is an especially great place to talk 
about this trend because one of the most vivid examples of the 
hydraulics of party power comes from Wisconsin’s own history.  It’s an 
excellent illustration of how party elites shape-shift in response to 
regulation.30 
During the first half of the twentieth century, Wisconsin imposed 
substantial regulations on political parties, limiting their ability to 
 
29. For a description and an overview of the political science literature, see Kang, supra 
note 23, at 151–55. 
30. The classic account is Frank J. Sorauf, Extra-Legal Political Parties in Wisconsin, 48 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 692 (1954).  See LEON D. EPSTEIN, POLITICS IN WISCONSIN 28–29 
(1958); Steven E. Schier, New Rules, New Games: National Party Guidelines and Democratic 
National Convention Delegate Selection in Iowa and Wisconsin, 1968–1976, 10 PUBLIUS 101, 
104–05 (1980).  For a similar take on this history, see SETH E. MASKET, NO MIDDLE 
GROUND: HOW INFORMAL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS CONTROL NOMINATIONS AND 
POLZARIZE LEGISLATURES 44 (2012) and Kang, supra note 23, at 147. 
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electioneer, make endorsements, raise money, etc.  Formal political 
parties couldn’t do much save run the nomination process. 
How did party elites respond to Wisconsin’s regulation?  They 
shape-shifted.  They looked to statewide “voluntary committees,” which 
interestingly enough had been created mostly by dissidents within the 
party.31  Those non-party organizations proved to be incredibly enticing 
to the party organization.  Party elites abandoned the official party 
structure for the private statewide voluntary committees that supported 
the party.  Party elites did all the electioneering and fundraising they 
needed to do through private associations.  And just as the Supreme 
Court in Citizens United blessed independent spending as 
“independent” from parties and candidates and thus protected by the 
First Amendment, the Wisconsin Supreme Court blessed voluntary 
committees as “independent” from the formal parties’ candidates and 
thus protected by the First Amendment.32 
The hydraulics of political power, in short, worked just as you’d 
expect.  When one outlet for power (the formal party) was closed, 
power found another outlet (a shadow party).  As the power of the 
voluntary committees grew, they became the de facto parties in 
Wisconsin politics.  The shadow parties, in short, became more 
important than the parties themselves. 
C. Independent Spending in 2012 and Beyond: The Rise of Shadow 
Parties? 
The Wisconsin example strikes me as quite salient today.  Once you 
understand the hydraulics of party power, once you recognize that party 
elites will shape-shift in response to changes in the regulatory 
environment, you can see that it’s quite easy to imagine the rise of 
shadow parties in the wake of Citizens United.  In fact, we already see 
party elites exercising a great deal of control over independent-spending 
organizations.  Despite the formal prohibitions on coordination, the 
independent SuperPACs and 501(c)(4)s are intimately interconnected 
with the real parties.  These organizations have started to look like 
shadow parties—they are outside of the formal structure but they have 
begun to house the party leadership. 
 
31. Sorauf, supra note 30, at 692. 
32. Sorauf, supra note 30, at 698 (citing State ex rel. La Follette v. Kohler, 200 Wis. 518, 
563–64, 228 N.W. 895 (1930)). 
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1. SuperPACs and Nonprofits: The New Home for Party Elites? 
To get a sense of which institutions party elites occupy nowadays, 
take a look at a great paper co-authored by one of my favorite political 
scientists, Seth Masket.33  It graphs the connections among the people 
who run 527s and party elites.  The connections are so deep and so 
pervasive that the diagram looks like a rat’s nest.   
The same deep connections run between the SuperPACs and the 
candidates they support.  Most of the SuperPACs are run by the people 
who used to run the candidate’s campaign.  And it’s not just staff 
members that tie the SuperPACs to their candidates and party.  It’s the 
candidates themselves, as has been brilliantly shown by Stephen 
Colbert, who has singlehandedly done more for campaign-finance 
reform than anyone in the last hundred years save Richard Nixon.  
Colbert did a great skit with his fellow comedian, Jon Stewart, and his 
lawyer, Trevor Potter, in which Potter represented both Colbert and 
Colbert’s SuperPAC at the same time.34  Colbert even put the leaders of 
both the campaign and the SuperPAC on the same conference call to 
talk strategy.   
The only problem with Colbert’s running joke is that it’s too 
accurate to be funny.  Colbert is playing it straight.  The reality is the 
farce; the comedy is the tragedy.  While there is no common-sense 
definition of coordination that would allow what we see today, the legal 
definition of coordination allows a great deal of, well, coordination.   
SuperPACs have used the same footage in advertisements as the 
campaigns they are supporting.35  SuperPACs and campaigns have even 
run what are basically the same ads.36  Sometimes they even share the 
 
33. Richard M. Skinner, Seth E. Masket & David A. Dulio, 527 Committees and the 
Political Party Network, 40 AM. POL. RES. 60 (2012). 
34. The Colbert Report: Mike Allen (Comedy Central television broadcast Jan. 12, 2012), 
available at http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/405889/january-12-2012/ 
indecision-2012—-colbert-super-pac—-coordination-resolution-with-jon-stewart. 
35. The story first appeared in Politico.  Ben Smith, Perry Ad Features SuperPAC 
Footage, POLITICO (Nov. 26, 2011), http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/1111/Perry_ad_fe
atures_SuprPAC_footage.html.  The Campaign Legal Center filed a complaint in response.  
Complaint, Campaign Legal Ctr. v. Make Us Great Again, Inc., MUR No. 6514 (Dec. 15, 
2011); see also FEC Complaint Filed Against Perry Campaign and Perry-Supporting Super 
PAC Urging Investigation of Shared Video Footage, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER (Dec. 15, 
2011), http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id
=1565:december-15-2011-fec-complaint-filed-against-perry-campaign-and-perry-supporting-
super-pac-urging-investigation-of-shared-video-footage&catid=63:legal-center-press-releases 
&Itemid=61. 
36. Gerry Mullany, Pro-Romney Super PAC Runs Ad Similar to 2007 Campaign Spot, 
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same office.  For instance, companies working for both the Mitt 
Romney SuperPAC and his campaign were in exactly the same suites in 
Alexandria, Virginia.37  Better yet, the founder of one of the companies 
was married to a deputy campaign manager for the Romney campaign.  
She, conveniently enough, also ran a consulting firm housed—you 
guessed it—in the same suite.  The husband, temporarily cursed with 
self-awareness, did at least admit that the arrangement looked 
“ridiculous.”  But, returning to Ferdinand the Bull mode, he also 
insisted that he and his wife never talked about the campaign.  He also 
told us not to worry about coordination with the third company in the 
suite—one also working for Romney’s SuperPAC as well as Karl Rove’s 
Crossroads GPS.  Why?  Because it was separated from the other 
companies by . . . a conference room. 
Even the top-tier leadership is connected.  Campaign heads—even 
some candidates themselves—have begun to attend SuperPAC 
fundraisers, while donors and operators of the SuperPACs regularly 
consult with party officials.  My favorite example of “noncoordination” 
is when Newt Gingrich told his own SuperPAC to stop running certain 
advertisements.38 
2. Where Will Jim Messina Work in 2020? 
This brings me to what I think is the real problem with Citizens 
United.  What does the emergence of these independent organizations 
mean for the structure of American politics?  What keeps me up at night 
is a simple question: Where is Jim Messina—Obama’s mad-genius of a 
campaign manager—going to work in 2016 or 2020?39  I’m worried about 
whether the Jim Messinas of the world will be working inside the formal 
party structure or outside of it, inside the Democratic and Republican 
parties or inside the shadow parties.  
 
THE CAUCUS, (Feb. 23, 2012, 3:14 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/23/pro-
romney-super-pac-runs-ad-similar-to-2007-campaign-spot/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_php=t 
rue&_type=blogs&_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=2. 
37. Mike McIntire & Michael Luo, Fine Line Between ‘Super PACs’ and Campaigns, 
N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2012, at A1.   
38. Sarah Huisenga, Gingrich to Super PAC: Fix Negative Ad or Take It Down, CBS 
NEWS (Jan. 13, 2012, 6:41 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/gingrich-to-super-pac-fix-
negative-ad-or-take-it-down/. 
39. After this speech was delivered, we learned where Jim Messina himself is going to 
work.  For the Hillary Clinton SuperPAC.  See Nicholas Confessore, Huge ‘Super PAC’ Is 
Moving Early to Back Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2014, at A1. 
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The SuperPACs and the nonprofits, after all, have started to 
function like shadow parties.  They raise money, they push candidates 
and issues, and their leadership is often the mirror image of the 
leadership of the parties themselves.  But these organizations have 
important advantages over the formal parties.  They can raise unlimited 
sums of money, often with minimal disclosure.  Election lawyers spend 
endless amounts of time dealing with the hassles associated with the 
formal parties raising money.  If you are a lawyer for one of the shadow 
parties, your biggest worry is that Congress or the FEC might actually 
start doing its job and pass regulations.  In this day and age, that’s not 
much of a worry. 
Given all the advantages that the shadow parties have over the 
formal parties, money will continue to flow toward them.  More 
importantly, power will continue to flow toward them.  The worry, then, 
is that in the ongoing and ever-present battle between the party elite 
and the party faithful, the leadership and the membership, the 
independent groups may shift the balance of power between the two. 
Before I talk about this possibility, I should offer a caveat.  It may be 
that the emergence of these independent organizations will mean 
nothing in the long term.  It’s important for academics to acknowledge 
that we don’t always know what’s going to happen next. 
It wasn’t that long ago when academics were wringing their hands 
over the weakness of the parties, their lack of unity, and their lack of a 
distinctive brand.  Now it’s just the opposite, with almost every 
academic joining the hue and cry over powerful, united parties with 
deeply polarized identities.  American politics churn at a marked pace.  
Any academic who tells you she is sure what’s going to happen in the 
wild and woolly world of politics isn’t an academic worth her salt.  
Moreover, we are dealing with shape-shifters here.  Change is 
necessarily part of the equation. 
More concretely, it may not matter if the newly emerging shadow 
parties operate alongside the formal parties.  The parties have often split 
their functions.  They have, for example, sometimes contracted out their 
registration or get-out-the-vote work to independent organizations.  It’s 
possible that the independent spending organizations will just be 
appendages—fundraising machines that allow the major parties vastly to 
exceed the limits we’ve imposed on them. 
Moreover, no matter how powerful they become, these independent 
organizations cannot displace the parties or their membership entirely.  
The party label is like a Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval.  It’s a 
shorthand for voters, one whose importance shouldn’t be 
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underestimated.40  Being the standard-bearer of a major political party 
matters.  For all its money and power, Crossroads GPS is a political 
brand unknown to most Americans.  It isn’t going to be running a 
presidential candidate anytime soon. 
But the role of the party in American politics goes far deeper than 
merely serving as a political heuristic, and here’s where we might think 
harder about the emerging structure of American politics if the shadow 
parties emerge as a powerful force.  Political parties don’t just matter 
because they provide a useful shorthand for voters.  Parties are also the 
fora in which interest groups coalesce, battle, and reach deals that allow 
for governance when the time comes.41  Parties are where a great deal of 
democratic compromise takes place; each major party offers a package 
of policymaking compromises that Americans, often reluctantly, choose 
between.  We sometimes think that politics and parties are a problem 
and governance is what matters.  But politics and parties are what make 
governance possible. 
Parties also provide the energy that fuels our democracy—they are 
the source of much of its creativity and generativity.  Party elites serve 
as “conversational entrepreneurs” in American politics.42  The battles 
between the parties, the battles within the parties, the wars among 
political elites and factions and interest groups all help set the policy-
making agenda, tee up questions for voters, frame issues, fracture 
existing coalitions, and generate new ones.43   
 
40. For an overview of the political science literature on party heuristics and a 
description of why they matter, see HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY 
OUR ELECTION SYSTEM IS FAILING AND HOW TO FIX IT 70–71 (2009). 
41. For an overview, see, e.g., NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, ON THE SIDE OF THE ANGELS: 
AN APPRECIATION OF PARTIES AND PARTISANSHIP (2010); Nathaniel Persily & Bruce E. 
Cain, The Legal Status of Political Parties: A Reassessment of Competing Paradigms, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 775 (2000); Nathaniel Persily, Toward a Functional Defense of Political Party 
Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 750 (2001); and Nancy L. Rosenblum, Political Parties as 
Membership Groups, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 813 (2000). 
42. ROBERT W. BENNETT, TALKING IT THROUGH: PUZZLES OF AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 34–37 (2003). 
43. Within the legal academy, Michael Kang has done some of the best work.  See, e.g., 
Michael S. Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE L.J. 734 (2008).  In the realm 
of social science, the literature builds on the work of Erving Goffman.  See ERVING 
GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE (1974).  
For a sampling of this literature, see, e.g., FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, 
AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1993); SHANTO IYENGAR & DONALD 
R. KINDER, NEWS THAT MATTERS: TELEVISION AND AMERICAN OPINION (1987); WILLIAM 
H. RIKER, THE ART OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION (1986); DEBORAH A. STONE, POLICY 
PARADOX AND POLITICAL REASON (1988); Dennis Chong & James N. Druckman, Framing 
 
GERKEN-FINAL (6-30-14) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2014  5:33 PM 
920 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:4 
Given the role that the parties play in American politics, should we 
worry about the development of shadow parties?  The nonprofits and 
SuperPACs do a lot of the things the major parties do.  They are 
institutions where elites can bargain, strike compromises, drive debates, 
frame issues, and sell candidates.  If these groups mostly existed 
separate and apart from the candidates, we might not worry, because 
the one thing a party requires is a candidate.  That is, as I noted above, 
why many thought that incumbents might put a stop to independent 
spending at some point: they wouldn’t like political power to exist 
outside the parties.44  But now incumbents can have their cake and eat it 
too.  These shadow parties are so tied to the candidates and the parties 
that politicians can take advantage of everything the formal party 
structure has to offer while being backed by a powerful independent 
fund-raising machine.  For this reason, one can imagine these shadow 
parties developing into institutions with strong ties to the candidate, to 
his donor base, to all of the elite decision makers and interest groups 
that matter for a campaign.   
The one group that these independent organizations will never 
house, however, is the party faithful.  The party faithful are the people 
who knock on doors, make calls, show up at rallies, and spend countless 
hours working for campaigns.  Everyday people who are passionate 
about politics, the party faithful do most of the ground work for the 
campaigns.  Call them politics’ foot soldiers, call them partisan hacks, 
call them crazy.  I call them the most glorious creatures in American 
politics.  And even as the shadow parties’ influences grow, the party 
faithful still reside in the formal party. 
What happens if the center of gravity shifts?  What happens if the 
elites run the shadow parties and the party faithful are left by 
themselves in the shell of the formal party structure?  What happens if 
what really matters in politics happens in the shadow party, not the 
formal party? 
Let me give a crude example.  The Christian Science Monitor ran a 
rather extraordinary story in the fall of 2012, when Romney was behind 
in the polls.45  The story suggested that the Romney campaign didn’t 
 
Theory, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 103 (2007); James N. Druckman, Political Preference 
Formation: Competition, Deliberation, and the (Ir)relevance of Framing Effects, 98 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 671 (2004); Deborah A. Stone, Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas, 
104 POL. SCI. Q. 281 (1989).  
44. Supra Part II.A. 
45. Liz Marlantes, Mitt Romney’s Debate Challenge: Keeping Karl Rove On Board, 
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have enough money to take it through November.  It was depending on 
outside spending, particularly Karl Rove’s massive war chest.  The 
reporter asked a simple question: What happens if Rove decides to cut 
Romney off?   
Now imagine you want to be a player in GOP politics.  Where do 
you want to work?  Do you want to work for Romney’s campaign?  Or 
Rove’s?  Romney’s formal party?  Or Rove’s shadow party? 
As I said before, it’s possible it won’t matter.  It’s possible that these 
shadow parties will simply remain convenient means for evading 
campaign-finance rules.  But it’s also possible that the center of gravity 
will shift.  We’ll see a bipartite world, with elites and big donors 
occupying one institution—wielding enormous power by virtue of their 
money—and the party faithful occupying the other.  
III. WHY WE SHOULD PLACE OUR FAITH IN THE PARTY FAITHFUL 
I worry about a world dominated by shadow parties because I have a 
slightly romanticized view of the party faithful.  I think of them as one of 
the few groups capable of keeping the parties honest.   
There’s long been a conundrum in politics.  Given that no voter can 
monitor every vote of every representative, how does the principal 
control the agent?  How do the people control their representatives? 
For a long time, one answer to that question has been the political 
parties.46  They enforce party discipline, punish defectors, reward 
loyalists, and keep the brand distinctive.  But then, of course, one 
wonders quis custodiet ipsos custodes?  Who will guard the guardians 
themselves?  Who will ensure that the parties do right by the voters?47 
The party faithful is a possible answer.  They serve as a bridge 
between the elites and the voter, between the party and the people.  
They provide an institutional check on the bargains that elites can strike, 
some brake on how many principles will get compromised along the 
way.  Party faithful are often political realists.  They understand that 
compromise needs to be made.  But they also believe in something—
that’s why they are the party faithful. 
 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/Dec 
oder-Wire/2012/1001/Mitt-Romney-s-debate-challenge-keeping-Karl-Rove-on-board-video. 
46. See, e.g., JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES?: THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION 
OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA 3–27 (1995). 
47. For an overview of the literature and an astute take on the question, see Samuel 
Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REV. 1627 
(1999). 
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The party faithful’s influence comes through informal mechanisms.  
The influence that comes from being part of the same organization, 
being under one roof, interacting regularly with the campaign 
leadership.  We are social animals.  Our views are shaped by those 
around us whether we are aware of it or not.48   
If you have faith in the party faithful, you might worry about shadow 
parties because they hive off the party elites from the party faithful, 
reducing the day-to-day interactions that have long connected the two 
groups.  If you have faith in the party faithful, you might worry that the 
emergence of a dual system—a party and a shadow party—will reduce 
the party faithful’s most important form of influence, the influence they 
exercise by virtue of being part of the same organization.  Big donors 
and big interests have always played an outsized role in politics.  Until 
now, though, one important access point for the everyday concerns of 
everyday people has been the everyday people who work for campaigns.  
What happens when even that access point is eliminated? 
If you have faith in the party faithful, the emergence of shadow 
parties might worry you for reasons that have nothing to do with the 
conventional wisdom about big donors and dark money. 
CONCLUSION 
I’ll end with a more modest, perhaps even a more optimistic claim.  
Politics is an ever-changing, dynamic force, and few things stay stable 
for long.  But I’ll stick with my romantic point as well.  As the campaign-
finance landscape evolves in response to Citizens United’s deregulation 
of independent spending, we shouldn’t lose track of the partisan hacks, 
the foot soldiers of politics, the worthiest and most honorable 
participants in the party structure: the party faithful.  While I’ve been 
among those who worry about driving money outside the parties, my 
bigger worry has become that we’re driving power outside the parties, 
turning them into shell organizations whose utility to candidates is little 
more than the heuristic.  We’re separating the party elites from the 
party faithful.  We’re ensuring that the party elites talk to the moneyed 
interests, and the party faithful talk to the rest of us.  The informal social 
network that once provided a bridge between those two worlds is slowly 
being dismantled.  I have faith in the party faithful and hope very much 
that they will continue to wield the power they do.  And it’s hard to see 
 
48. For a survey of this literature and its import, see GERKEN, supra note 40, at 87–88. 
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how that will be true if the power of the shadow parties exceeds that of 
the real ones. 
